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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal
by virtue of Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred in granting summary

judgment in favor of defendants.

Summary judgment presents only

questions of law reviewable for correctness.
P.2d 360 (Utah App. 1996).

Mills

v.

Brody,

929

This issue was preserved in the trial

court by plaintiffs1 Reply in Support of Plaintiffs1 Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and Response to Defendant Harmon's
Motion for Summary Judgment (R.63), and by the arguments
presented to the trial court at the August 28, 1998 hearing on
the parties1 motions for summary judgment.
2.

(R.127)

Whether the trial court erred in denying plaintiffs1

motion for partial summary judgment.

Summary judgment presents

only questions of law reviewable for correctness.
Brody,

929 P.2d 360 (Utah App. 1996).

Mills

v.

This issue was preserved

in the trial court by plaintiffs1 Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment (R.55), the Reply in Support of
Plaintiffs1 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Response to
Defendant Harmon's Motion for Summary Judgment (R.63), and by the
arguments presented to the trial court at the August 28, 1998
hearing on the parties1 motions for summary judgment.

(R.127)

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, ETC.
There are no determinative constitutional provisions,
statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations whose interpretation

is determinative or of central importance to this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a final order of the Third Judicial

District Court of Salt Lake County granting defendants1 Motion
for Summary Judgment and denying plaintiffs1 Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment.
II.

Statement of Facts
1.

On or about April 1, 1980, Joseph W. Thurber and Rhoda

Thurber, as trustors, executed a Declaration of Trust in which
they declared that they were holding in trust, among other
things, the real property located at 2480 Alden Street, Salt Lake
City, Utah.
2.

(R.6)

Joseph W. Thurber is the deceased father of plaintiff

Jeannine Perrenoud and the deceased stepfather of plaintiff Linda
Jenkins and defendants Lila Ann Harman and Lloyd Mitchell.

Rhoda

Thurber is the deceased stepmother of plaintiff Jeannine
Perrenoud and the deceased mother of all of the other parties.
(R.l-2)
3.

The Declaration of Trust was properly recorded with the

Office of the Salt Lake County Recorder on April 14, 1980.
4.

(R.2)

On April 1, 1980, the trustors also Quit-Claimed the

real property to themselves as Trustees under the terms of the
Declaration of Trust.

The Quit-Claim Deed was properly recorded

with the Office of the Salt Lake County Recorder on April 14,
1980.

(R.2)

5.

Joseph W. Thurber predeceased Rhoda Thurber.

Thereafter, on or about August 5, 1992, Rhoda Thurber, as Trustee
of the Joseph W. Thurber and Rhoda Thurber Trust, sold the real
property.
6.

(R.3)
The purchasers, defendant Lila Ann Harman's daughter and

son-in-law, Holli Bezzant and Robert Bezzant, executed a
Promissory Note calling for monthly payments of $612.00.
7.

(R.37)

Pursuant to the express terms of the trust, the proceeds

of the sale of the real property became part of the trust res.
(R.7)
8.
trust.
9.

Plaintiffs are two of the four beneficiaries of the
Defendants are the other two beneficiaries.

(R.6)

The trust specifically states that "if one of the above

listed should be deceased, the beneficiaries cannot be changed."
(R.7)
10.

Between January and July of 1997, and without

authorization or consent, defendants Lila Ann Harman and Lloyd
Mitchell wrongfully exercised dominion and control over the trust
res in a manner inconsistent with plaintiffs1 rights therein.
Specifically, defendants received monthly payments on the above
referenced Promissory Note in the sum of $4,284.00 which they
converted to their own use and benefit.
11.

(R.37)

Plaintiffs filed their Complaint commencing this action

on September 4, 1997.
March 2, 1998.

An Amended Complaint was filed on or about

Therein, plaintiffs allege causes of action for

breach of fiduciary duty and conversion.

(R.48)

12.

Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

on or about February 28, 1998, requesting that the trial court
enter summary judgment on plaintiffs1 conversion claim.
13.

(R.54)

On or about March 10, 1998, defendant Lila Ann Harmon

filed her Opposition to Plaintiffs1 Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.
14.

(R.30)

A hearing on both motions was held before the trial

court on August 28, 1998. On October 4, 1998 the trial court
entered Findings of Fact and Summary Judgment.

Therein,

defendants were granted summary judgment and plaintiffs1
Complaint was dismissed with prejudice.
15.

(R.126a)

Plaintiffs timely filed their Notice of Appeal on

October 30, 1998.

(R.116)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Plaintiffs became beneficiaries of the trust when it was
created on April 1, 1980. Plaintiffs1 beneficial interests were
not contingent on their survival of the trustors as the trial
court found.

Accordingly, Rhoda Thurber, as trustee, owed a

fiduciary duty to plaintiffs which she breached when she revoked
the trust and sold the property to defendant Lila Ann Harman's
daughter and son-in-law.

The sale is, therefore, voidable.

Additionally, the trust instrument specifically prohibits
any change of beneficiaries after the death of one of the
trustors.

The clear intent of this provision is that, after the

death of one of the trustors, the other trustor would not be able
to terminate the beneficial interest of his or her step-children.
A

The trial court emasculated the trustors1 intent by ruling that
Rhoda Thurber was entitled to end run this prohibition by simply
revoking the trust, thereby terminating the interest of her stepdaughter, plaintiff Jeannine Perrenoud.
ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in granting defendants1 Motion for
Summary Judgment and denying plaintiffs1 Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment.
The determinative questions with respect to the issue of
whether the trial court erred in ruling on the parties1
respective motions for summary judgment are: (1) Whether Rhoda
Thurber could, consistent with her fiduciary duty as trustee,
revoke the trust by selling the property to defendant Harman's
daughter and son-in-law; and (2) whether Rhoda Thurber, following
Joseph W. Thurberfs death, succeeded to all the powers previously
belonging to the joint trustees. As discussed in detail below,
plaintiffs respectfully submit that both questions must be
answered in the negative and, therefore, that defendants1 motion
for summary judgment should have been denied and plaintiffs1
motion for partial summary judgment should have been granted.
A.

Rhoda Thurber1s revocation of the Declaration
of Trust was in breach of her fiduciary duty to
plaintiffs and is, therefore, voidable.

Relying on the Supreme Court of Utah's decision in In
Estate

of West,

re

948 P.2d 351 (Utah 1997), the trial court held

that Rhoda Thurber did not breach any fiduciary duty to
plaintiffs when she revoked the trust because at that time she
was the sole surviving active beneficiary of the trust and

plaintiffs were contingent beneficiaries.

Therefore, according

to the trial court, Rhoda Thurber did not owe plaintiffs a
fiduciary duty at the time she revoked the trust.

Except for two

crucial distinctions discussed in detail below, the JVest case is
directly on point with the case at bar.

It is not, however,

helpful to defendants.
In that case, Herschel West and his first wife Hazel
executed a Declaration of Trust declaring that they held their
Provo home in trust for the benefit of themselves and after their
deaths for their three adult children.

After Hazel's death,

Herschel executed a Quit Claim Deed conveying the property to
himself and his second wife as joint tenants with full rights of
survivorship.

After Herschel1s death and their discovery that

the property was not included in his estate, the children brought
suit against the second wife alleging that the Quit Claim Deed
was voidable as a violation of Herschelfs fiduciary duty as
trustee.

The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings in

favor of the second wife.

This Court reversed, West

v.

West,

915

P.2d 504 (Utah App. 1996), and the Supreme Court of Utah granted
certiorari, 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996), reversed this Court f s
judgment, and reinstated the judgment of the trial court.

948

P.2d at 356.
In doing so, the Supreme Court identified three
determinative questions: "(1) whether the West Trust did in fact
authorize Hershel and Hazel as trustees to sell or otherwise
dispose of the house and thereby revoke the trust,(2) whether

Herschel West, following Hazel West f s death, became the sole
trustee and succeeded to all the powers previously belonging to
the joint trustees, and (3) whether Herschel West could,
consistent with his fiduciary duty as trustee, remove the house
from the trust by quitclaiming it to himself and his second
wife."

948 P.2d at 353-354.

As indicated above, only the second and third of the
questions posed by the West

court are at issue in the case at

bar: whether Rhoda Thurber succeeded to all the powers previously
belonging to the joint trustees, and whether Rhoda Thurber could,
consistent with her fiduciary duty as trustee, remove the house
from the trust by deeding it to defendant Harman f s daughter and
son-in-law.

Plaintiffs will address the second question in part

B below.
With respect to the third question (i.e., "whether Herschel
West could, consistent with his fiduciary duty as trustee, remove
the house from the trust") , the West

court held that as sole

surviving trustee Herschel "could sell or dispose of the property
as he saw fit.

This involved no breach of his fiduciary duty

since he was at that point the sole beneficiary."

948 P. 2d at

356.
As stated above, the West

case is directly on point with the

case at bar, with two crucial distinctions.

First, unlike Rhoda

Thurber in the case at bar, Herschel West was not only the sole
surviving trustee, he was also the sole present beneficiary of
the trust.

The Supreme Court explained as follows:

The trust instrument is clear that the children do not
become beneficiaries until the "death of the survivor"1 of
the two settlors. The instrument provides:
NOW, THEREFORE, KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that we
do hereby acknowledge and declare that we hold and will
hold said real property and all our right, title and
interest in and to said property and all furniture,
fixtures and personal property situated therein on the
date of the death of the survivor of us, IN TRUST.
1. For the use and benefit of the following (3)
persons [naming the three children].
([Supreme Court's] emphasis added). The children's rights
are subject to divestiture and will not ripen until the
death of the surviving settlor.z
Consequently, we conclude that Herschel West, Sr., as
sole trustee, could sell or dispose of the property as he
saw fit. This involved no breach of his fiduciary duty
since he was at that point the sole beneficiary.
948 P.2d at 355-356 (emphasis partly original).
Thus, the West court held that Herschel West's Quit Claim
Deed to himself and his second wife was not in violation of his
fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries of the trust because at that
point he was the only beneficiary.

Under the express terms of

the trust, Herschel's children would not become beneficiaries
until his death, or, in the language of the trust instrument upon
the "death of the survivor of us." Id.
In the case at bar, however, plaintiffs have been present
beneficiaries of the trust since its execution on April 1, 1980.
In contrast to the trust instrument at issue in West,
Declaration of Trust specifically states that:

Emphasis added.
2

Citations omitted.

here the

NOW, THEREFORE, KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that we
do hereby acknowledge and declare that we hold and will hold
said real property and all right, title and interest in and
to said property and all furniture, fixtures and personal
property situated therein IN TRUST:
1. For the use and benefit of the following FOUR
persons in equal shares per stirpes:
1. LLOYD MELVIN MITCHELL (OUR SON)
2. LILA ANN HARMAN (OUR DAU.)
3. LINDA MARIE JENKINS (OUR DAU.)
4. JEANNINE PERRENOUD (OUR DAU.)
Unlike the trust instrument at issue in West,

(R.6)

there is no

provision that plaintiffs were not to become beneficiaries until
the "death of the survivor" of the two settlors.
In short, in West

"the trust instrument [was] clear that the

children [would] not become beneficiaries until the ^death of the
survivor"3 of the two settlors."

Conversely, in the case at bar

the trust instrument is clear that plaintiffs became
beneficiaries on the date of its execution, April 1, 1980.
Thus, unlike Herschel West, in the case at bar Rhoda Thurber
was not the sole beneficiary when she revoked the trust.
Plaintiffs were also beneficiaries.

Accordingly, Rhoda owed

fiduciary obligations to plaintiffs as described in West:
[e]xcept as otherwise provided by the terms of the trust, a
trustee shall observe standards in dealing with the trust
assets that would be observed by a prudent man dealing with
the property of another ... Any ... transaction which is
affected by a substantial conflict of interest on the part
of the trustee, is voidable by any interested person, ...
unless ... the trust expressly authorized the transaction.4
948 P.2d at 355 (quoting Utah Code Ann. sections 75-7-302 &
3

948 P.2d at 355 (emphasis added).

4

Citation omitted.

404(2)).
There is no question that Rhoda Thurber's revocation of the
trust was in violation of her fiduciary duty to plaintiffs and
was tainted by a conflict of interest.

Plaintiffs1 beneficial

interests were terminated and effectively transferred to Rhoda»s
other two children.

Accordingly, the revocation is voidable and

the proceeds of the sale of the property remain part of the trust
res.

Defendants receipt and use of those proceeds for their own

benefit was, therefore, actionable conversion under the
undisputed facts of this case.
Also distinguishing the case at bar from West

is the fact

that in their Declaration of Trust Joseph Thurber and Rhoda
Thurber specifically stated their intention that if one of them
should die the other would not be able to do exactly what in
effect Rhoda did after Joseph died, i.e., change the
beneficiaries.

The second to last paragraph of the Declaration

of Trust provides that "If one of the above listed should be
deceased, the beneficiaries cannot be changed."
In Makoff

v.

Makoff,

(R.7)

528 P.2d 797, 798 (Utah 1974), the

Supreme Court of Utah stated that:
The general rules of construction of written instruments
apply to the construction of trust instruments, and those
rules require a determination of the intention of the
settlor... [I]n ascertaining the intention of the settlor we
may consider the entire instrument aided by the surrounding
circumstances existing at the time of creation of the trust.
(Emphasis added).
In the case at bar, the intention of Joseph and Rhoda
Thurber is clear: after one of them died, the other would not be

able to cut his or her step-children out of the picture.
Nonetheless, the trial court held that the trust instrument's
prohibition against changing beneficiaries did not prevent Rhoda
Thurber from revoking the trust and effectively transferring the
res to defendants.

(R.126c, paragraph 15)

At the August 28,

1998 hearing on the parties1 motions for summary judgment, the
trial court explained as follows:
I'm going to grant Summary Judgment finding that the
trust was terminated by the sell (sic) of the property. The
language, I'm assuming for the sake of argument that Mr.
Mitchell is correct that the parties wanted to set up a
trust that would not be changed after one died. I mean, I
read that as the intent of the language where it says, "If
one of the above listed should be deceased, the
beneficiaries cannot be changed." But I'm going to find as
a matter of law that that is insufficient to prevent the
revocation of the trust after one of them dies.
That the language is a revocable trust and as such one
of the trustees can revoke it. They could not change the
beneficiaries. The parties are not here, we're stuck with
the language that they agreed upon. The language that they
agreed upon was that the beneficiaries could not be changed
as opposed to the trust could not be revoked. I happen to
think it's an unfortunate result but I think that's what the
language compels.
(R.127, pages 20-21)(emphasis added).
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that it is clear that in
interpreting the trust instrument the trial court wanted to, but
mistakenly believed it was prohibited from "consider[ing] the
entire instrument aided by the surrounding circumstances existing
at the time of creation of the trust." 528 P. 2d at 798.

To the

contrary, the trial court believed it was constrained to look at
the trust provision authorizing revocation without regard to the
trust provision which the trial court specifically interpreted as

meaning that the trustors intended "to set up a trust that would
not be changed after one died."
In other words, the trial court believed that both Joseph
Thurber and Rhoda Thurber intended to restrict each others right
to terminate their step-childrensf beneficial interests in the
trust after the death of one of them.

Nonetheless, the trial

court believed that it was required to read the revocation
language in the trust in isolation, thereby allowing Rhoda to end
run that intention by simply revoking the trust, rather than
changing beneficiaries.
B.

Rhoda Thurber did not succeed to all of the powers
previously belonging to the joint trustees.

As set forth above, one of the questions which the Supreme
Court found determinative in West was "whether Herschel West,
following Hazel West's death, ... succeeded to all of the powers
previously belonging to the joint trustees..." 948 P.2d at 353.
As it did with the other two questions, the Supreme Court also
answered this question in the affirmative.

However, its

rationale for doing so is clearly not applicable to the case at
bar.

Justice Howe explained that the instrument at issue in that

case must be construed as granting the sole trustee the same
powers as the joint trustees previously had:
Otherwise, a sole trustee would have less power than the
joint trustees held. That would be illogical, as nothing in
the trust instrument denies to a sole trustee any of the
powers possessed by the joint trustees.
948 P.2d at 354 (emphasis added).

However, as discussed in part A above, the trust instrument
at issue in this case does in fact specifically deny a sole
trustee power possessed by the joint trustees, i.e., the power to
change beneficiaries.

The trial court unequivocally stated its

belief that the trustors "wanted to set up a trust that would not
be changed after one died."

(R.125, page 20)

case at bar is distinguishable from

Accordingly, the

West.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, plaintiffs respectfully request that
the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of
defendants be reversed and that this case be remanded to the
trial court with instructions for the entry of summary judgment
in favor of plaintiffs with respect to their conversion claim.
DATED this J> ' dSy of November, 1999.

:tT(. Mitchell
Forney for Plaintiffs

MAILING CERTIFICATE
Undersigrie^ certifies that two copies of the foregoing were
mailed thisdf^"^ day of November, 1999, via first class U.S.
Mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Randall L. Skeen
5788 South 900 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
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IN THE THIRD -DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR THE
2

STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE COUNTY

3

-oOo-

4
5

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF: THURBER, RHODA
NELSON MITCHELL

)
)
)
)

SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Case No. 973900675

6
Judge William A. Thome
7
-oOo8
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 28th day of August,
9
1998, the above-entitled matter came on for hearing before
10
the Honorable William A. Thome, sitting as Judge in the
11
above-named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that
12
the following proceedings were had.
13
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PRO-CE-E

1

THE COURT:

2
3

D I N G S

And the other matter is 973900675, the

matter of the estate of Rhoda Thurber.

4

MR. MITCHELL:

Good morning, Your Honor,., Scott

5

Mitchell on behalf of the parties.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

6

Randall Skeen and Tom

7 Mecham on behalf of defendant, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

8

Are you ready to go forward with the

9 partial summary judgment on this?
10

MR. MITCHELL:

11

MR. SKEEN:

Yes, Your Honor.

Yes, Your Honor, but I believe, I'm

12

not sure they're partial, I think they're cross motions for

13

complete summary judgment.

14

THE COURT: Okay.

15

MR. MITCHELL:

Actually mine's a partial motion

16

for'summary judgment, though-at this time I can't remember

17

why.

18

THE COURT:

Okay, go ahead, Mr. Mitchell.

19

MR. MITCHELL:

Your Honor, this involves a trust,

20

a declaration of trust that was signed and recorded in April

21

of 1980.

The trustors were Joseph Thurber and Rhoda

22

Thurber.

They were the stepparents and parents of the

23

plaintiffs and defendants.

24

and defendants were the children of Rhoda Thurber, and Mrs.

O C\ II D i i im n o

t»rVi /-\ • e»

V^ ^ >~*a

*i r-i

f- Vi ^

The plaintiff, Linda Jenkins,

/~>s\i i «*»•-

f- ^\*A m r

».»-» «-»

•- V* ^

.J _ . . _ 1 _ *. ^ *-.

-^ J

4
1 Joseph Thurber
The trust transferred a lot of property, the main

2

3 property being the residence, the party's residence into the
4

trust.

The problem arose when Joseph died, Rhoda^ took the

5 property, sold it and transferred everything to the
6 defendants in her will, she's now deceased.

It's my

7 understanding also that defendant Lloyd Mitchell died over
8

the weekend or late last week sometime.
In any event, the facts of this case, except for

9
10

in two respects, are identical to the Supreme Court's

11

decision in the Estate of West.

12

distinctions are in the West case the children didn't become

13

beneficiaries specifically and by the terms of the trust

14

until the trustors died.

15

different.

16

of "'reading "the briefs but x^Trs~ spelled out pretty distinctly

17

by both parties in the briefs.

18

The two important

In this case, the language is

And I don't know if the Court's had the benefit

The other fact is that, and actually there's two

19

facts, the Declaration of Trust in this case provides that,

20

and it's aimed at making a protective barrier to protect

21

each parties children, in other words, to protect the

22

stepchildren when the, when that childrens' parent died.

23

And the trust provides if one of the above listed trustors

24

should be deceased the beneficiaries cannot be changed.

25

other words, what if Joseph dies, Rhoda can't cut Jeanine

In

5

1

out, okay, that's specif i.naT-ly i-n~the~t£ust, and that's a

2

distinction with the West case.
I just want to read a passage from the West case

3
4

that deals with this.

5

children do not become beneficiaries," and this is the

6

Courtfs quotes, "the death of the survivor of the two

7

settlers."

8
9
10

"The trust incident is cl^ar that the

Then it goes to reason of trust.
THE COURT:

Is that pursuant to the language of

the trust or is that just by operation of law?
MR. MITCHELL:

11 II the trust.

That is pursuant to -the language of

The Court goes on to quote the language of the

12

trust and the emphasized language in the trust that the

13

Court, in the whole passage, is death of the survivor of us.

14

Okay, that's not in our trust.

15

say the children's vested rights are subject to divestiture

16

and will"not ride until the death of the surviving settler.

17

In our case it transfers it in trust and

18

specifically identifies these beneficiaries and says nothing

19

about surviving until it goes down, and this is something

20

defendant's brought up in their brief, when it talks about

21

after they die then it talks about distributing to the

22

surviving beneficiaries, okay, but nothing in the granting

23

language, and that's the language and the important part of

24

the West case.

Then the Court goes on to

But I think even more important, as a matter

6
1
2

is the intention of t-K<=> p5>£-i gg .".
Now, in the West case the trust, there was no

3

limitation on the trustors, or the trustees right to revoke

4

or alter the trust ever.

5

this is a formed trust, that the language that I'm pointing

In our case it's specifically, and

6 out to the Court about the beneficiaries cannot be changed
7 when one of the parties dies, that's typed in, okay, that's
8 II the parties themselves that put that in there, that's not
9
10

just boiler plate.
And I'll read another part from the West case.

11

The West case had three part test, only two of which are at

12

issue before the Court today.

13

two trustors had the power to sell the property and revoke

14

the trust before one of them died, okay.

15

that to be present in West and that's present indisputably

16

in this "case.

17

die whether the other trustor inherited all powers, in other

18

words, whether she could revoke that. And here in the West

19

case the Court said a sole trustee would, held that they did

20

in that case because otherwise a sole trustee would have

21

less power than the joint trustees held, and the Court said,

22

"That would be illogical as nothing in the trust instrument

23

denies a sole trustee any of the powers possessed by the

One of those is, okay, the

The Court found

The second tes~t~~is after one of the trustors

24 I joint trustee."
Tn mir r^ase it clearly does.

It says after one of

7
1 || us dies you can't rhangp FHP_ bpnpf i r.i *-H P S ; you can't cut
2 II Jeanine out of her inheritance.
3 II

THE COURT:

Well, what about withdrawing property

4 || from the trust though, is that restricted?
5

MR. MITCHELL:

It is.

?rir

What is says in here is if

6

the home is sold, and that's what happened, the money is to

7

be put in a trust designated the Thurber Trust, okay, that

8

wasn't done.

9

distributing it to Rhoda while she was alive and then to the

Basically what they did is they started

10

defendants after she died.

11

time for rebuttal.

So, I'll reserve -the rest of my

12

THE COURT:

Mr. Skeen?

13

MR. SKEEN:

Thank you, Your Honor.

May I

14

approach?

I've got a copy of the case that is in the trust

15

so that the Court can follow along.

16

fairly complex case factually, but I think it's pretty

17

simple legally.

18

on is that the matter can be disposed of via Summary

19

Judgment, and secondly, that the West case is controlling,

20

and I don't know whether we just read it differently or not.

21

But just to start out, if I could go over just the

22

facts so that we're all on the same page there, on April 1st

23

of 1980, Joseph and Rhoda Thurber executed the Declaration

24

of Trust, a copy of which I've provided to Counsel and the

25

Court.

Your Honor, this is a

One thing I think Counsel and I both agree

In 1995, Joseph died and later that year, or excuse

8
1 ||me, 1985, Joseph died."

La t- f*r '~t ha t -year -on December 16th,

2 || Rhoda executed a will which revoked all prior testamentary
3 II instruments.

On June 29th of 1992, she executed a second

4

will, which again, revoked all prior testamentary^documents

5

and neither one of the two wills mentioned, the '85 or the

6

'92 mentioned the plaintiffs as beneficiaries.

7
8

They, incidentally, were stepchildren of Rhoda's
and maybe Counsel didn't make that clear.

9

THE COURT:

And children of Joseph's?

10

MR. SKEEN:

And children of Joseph'-S, correct.

11

THE COURT:

Okay.

12

MR. SKEEN:

On August 15, of 1992, Rhoda sold the

13

home, which I think forms really the basis of the dispute.

14
15

THE COURT:

The home is conveyed in this

Declaration of Trust to the trust?

16

MR. SKEEN:

Yes.

Anyway, in 19 92 the home is sold

17

to (inaudible), one of which is a granddaughter of Rhoda,

18

pursuant to a contract which paid $612 per month.

19
20

THE COURT:

Did the title documents identify the

trust as the holder of the home?

21

MR. SKEEN:

I believe so.

I don't have copies of

22

those with me, Your Honor, but I believe they did.

23

which trust?

24
O C II mf»

She formed a secondary trust in--

THE COURT:
fhis

—

Well,

Okay, of the one that you just handed

1 ||

MR. SKEEN: The TO Id >one, the _ 1980 one?

2 ||

THE COURT:

3 II

MR. SKEEN: Yes.

4 II

THE COURT:

I guess it is.

5 J)

MR. SKEEN:

Uh-huh.

6

THE COURT:

And so the title documents would have

Right, was that the '80 trust?

7

identified this trust, the !80 trust as the holder of the

8

home?

9

MR. SKEEN:

I believe that they did.

10

THE COURT:

And so the proceeds from that sale

11

they should have funneled into the trust, did they not do

12

that?

13

MR. SKEEN:

Well, they did not because, again,

14

consistent with our argument and with the West case, they

15

didn't need to.

16

Einal-

17

The trust was revoked.

THE COURT:

And then the

Are there documents that revoke this

18

trust as opposed to simply, it says, revokes testamentary

19

instruments.

20

MR. SKEEN:

Right, those are the only ones, but

21

it's going to be done pursuant to the terms of the 1980

22

trust, I'm getting right to that.

23

THE COURT:

Okay.

24

MR. SKEEN:

The last fact, Your Honor, is that on

25 II December 22nd--oh, I wanted to indicate when she diri SP! 1

10
1

the home she lived on the .prngpp.ds of -t-.hp $612 per month

2

until she died on December 22, of 1996.

3

identifies three issues, and Counsel alluded to them as

4

well.

5

ones that were identified by the Court are the exact same

Now, the West case

And they're the identical issues in this-^ase, the

6 ones.
7

The first issue is did Rhoda have the authority

8 pursuant to the trust to terminate the trust pursuant to the
9

terms thereof?

I'm not sure whether plaintiffs' agree, I

10

think I heard them say they do, but just so we're all on the

11

same page, drawing your attention to paragraph three of the

12

1980 Declaration of Trust.

13

ourselves the power and right at any time during our

14

lifetime to amend or revoke in whole or in part the trust

15

hereby created without necessity of obtaining consent of any

16

of 'the beneficiaries and without giving notice to any

17

beneficiary, but no such amendment or revocation shall be

18

effective unless and until it is filed in the land records."

19

That's part one, that was identified, and

20

incidentally the language is virtually identical in the West

21

case trust.

22

Court that that gives the settlers, which would be Rhoda and

23

the decedent at that time, the opportunity and ability

24

without notifying the beneficiaries, without doing anything

25

to terminate the trust.

It says, "We reserve unto

That language states pursuant to the Supreme

11
1 II

The second sentencer however—applies to the

2

trustees.

3

whole or any part of the property held here under shall

4

constitute as to such whole or part revocation o£rthis

5

trust."

6

language of the 1980 trust, it does allow the trust to be

7

terminated.

8
9

It says, "The sell or disposition by us of the

So I think reading the West case, and clearly the

And the second issue is, well, and I might
indicate also that once the property, the real property was

10

conveyed to Pizzance the trust was absolutely terminated.

11

Whether it had been so in the 1992 will, the 1995

12

disposition document.

13
14

THE COURT:
"us" that's there?

Did the West case talk in terms of the

Does that require--

15

MR. SKEEN:

It did.

It did.

16

THE COURT:

--that the trustors to be both alive?

17

MR. SKEEN:

It did, yes, and it said they do not.

18

That's one of the prime holdings.

19

is precisely on point.

20

you've stated.

21

trustee or co-settler unilaterally exercise the right to

22

terminate a trust subsequent to the death of the co-trustee?

23

The West case said absolutely.

24

That's why the West case

Now, the second issue is just what

The second issue is can a surviving co-

The trust says absolutely.

I draw your attention first to paragraph five of

12
1

us, the survivor shalT rnnfvnwp -as sole—trustee. M

2

West case it said exactly the same thing.

3

once Mr. West's prior spouse had died he was the sole

In the

They held that

4 II trustee and had all the authority under the willr-and under
5

statutory law to act as such.

6

section that paraphrases that, it's Utah Code Annotated

7

75.7.405 (2), and it clearly says that once you have the

8

demise of one trustee or settler then the survivor has all

9

the authority of both of them, and that includes the

10
11

Now, in fact, we have a code

authority to revoke. m
Now, the third issue, and I think again, if I'm

12

reading it right, I think plaintiffs' agree with that.

13

think what they're disputing is really the third issue, and

14

that is whether or not Rhoda had the authority or was it a

15

breach of her fiduciary duty to terminate the trust?

16

the Continental Bank case which we cited in our brief and

17

also was cited by the West Court it says, and I quote, "The

18

trustee can exercise exclusive control over trust property

19

subject to the limitations imposed by law or by the trust

20

instrument."

21

I

And in

Now, if we give that third issue, was she able to

22

basically terminate the trust, we know that she has the

23

authority to do it, but could she terminate the trust and do

24 I what she did without violating her fiduciary duty?

The

13

1 precludes that.

Well, and they -s-ay that, in their brief

2

they said, "Well, it doesn't say upon the death of the

3

survivor of us," type language.

4

that that differentiates us from the West case.xr:

5

And, you know, they say

Well, if I draw the Court's attention, it's the

6 very next paragraph under where the beneficiaries are named.
7

It says, "Upon the death of the survivor of us, unless all

8

the beneficiaries shall predecease us or unless we shall die

9

as a result of a common accident or disaster, our successor

10

trustee," this is after they die, "is hereby -directed to

11

forthwith transfer said property and all right title and

12

interest to said property unto the beneficiaries absolutely

13

and thereby terminate this trust."

14

That is precisely the language in the West case,

15

it's just in a different part of the West trust.

16

both these little form book trusts, is what the West Court

17

calls them.

18

farther below is all.

19

What does it say?

20

beneficiaries are still alive, says, "Our successor

21

trustee," and this is after both of us die, "is directed to

22

transfer the property."

23

They're

And it just happened to be one paragraph
But it says exactly the same thing.

The survivor of us, provided all the

Now, that tracks exactly with the third issue as

24

identified in the West Court.

What happened there is West,

25

Hershel West was the beneficiary of the trust and he was

14
1

also the trustee.

2

because the beneficiaries of the trust were Rhoda and the

3

other named plaintiff and her brother, Lloyd, who died last

4

week.

5

beneficiaries have different status, and that's the

6

important, and the ruling in the West case.

7

plaintiff's, Your Honor, were contingent beneficiaries

8

subject to change.

9

was an active beneficiary.

10

This_'c^sft ts -a-little bit different

But the Supreme Court clearly states thatr£hese

The

Whereas Rhoda, just like Hershel West,

And the case

says

exactly

that.

In fact, in

11 probably the best language in the case for us, and I'll draw
12 your attention to page 354 of the West case, which I've
13

provided, and I've hi-lighted it in yellow.

14

common sense--

It defies

15

THE COURT:

Just a moment.

16

MR. SKEEN:

3 54, it's on the right hand column,

17

about 60 percent down.

18

THE COURT:

Okay.

19

MR. SKEEN:

"It defies common sense that a couple

20

creating a revocable inner viva voce trust naming themselves

21

as trustees would deliberately preclude themselves from

22

fully utilizing the property for their own benefit while

23

both or either one of them was alive, particularly when it

24

appears that the purpose of the form book trust document may

25

have been simply to avoid probate.

Therefore, we conclude

15

1 || that upon the death of Haa@l Wesfc-r-Hershel West succeeded to
2 || all the powers exercisable by the joint trustees, including
3 || the power to sell or dispose of the property which works as
4 II a revocation of the trust."
5

That, Your Honor, is exactly what we have here.

6

You have two distinct groups of beneficiaries.

You have an

7

active beneficiary that has all the rights to do basically

8

whatever they want with that property during their lifetime,

9

that's why it's an inner viva voce trust.

And then you have

10

a secondary contingent group that, whofs rights arise upon

11

death of the surviving trustee provided there has been no

12

other distribution, sell, termination or revocation of the

13

trust.

14

and what this case is all about.

And that is simply in a nutshell what the case says

15

The, we wouldn't be here today, Your Honor, if

16

Rhoda~Raclnvt/ pursuant to the terms of the trust, sold the

17

home or if Rhoda hadn't, pursuant to the terms of the trust,

18

terminated the trust by doing new wills, preparing new

19

wills.

20

issue because I think that the three part test as defined by

21

the West Court case, those three prongs have been met

22

clearly.

23

course, we get to this other language about the home was

24

sold, it's put into a trust, blah, blah, blah, please note

Now, it's interesting, and I'm not sure it's even an

I mean, this case is right on point.

And then, of

25 II that we don!t know, and there's no authentication of when

16
1

that language was put in-. The signa-fcttre-s are above that and

2

there's no initialing.
And on the first page where there were some strike

3
4

outs you'll notice that the parties to the trust-'initialed

5

that so it is not a self authenticating instrument in any

6 event.

But I don't think we even need to get that far.

I

7

think the trust was terminated according to the terms of the

8

trust and according to the law as defined in the West case.

9 Thank you.
MR. MITCHELL:

10

Your Honor, the trust instrument

11 was recorded on April 1, 1980.

The suggestion that somehow

12

this was put in later is ridiculous.

13

is not in evidence, it's not an issue in this case, it's

14

never been brought up, hasn't been briefed, we've never seen

15

it.

16

somewhere, but it's certainly never been briefed, it's not

17

an exhibit, it's nothing.

18

case is not at issue.

19

The December 1985 will

I assume that the June 29, 1992, will is on file

The effect of those wills on this

Counsel says that we're not disputing two and

20

three of the West case and that's not correct.

The West

21

case, and Counsel reads the part of the West case that says,

22

"Defies common sense that a couple creating a revocable

23

inner viva voce trust naming themselves as trustee would

24

deliberately preclude themselves from fully utilizing the

25

property for their own benefit."

That's clearly not the

17
1

case in ours.

You look afibve>'that-a—couple of sentences,

2

"Nothing in the trust instrument denies--

3 II

THE COURT:

4

MR. MITCHELL:

5

8
9

Two sentences above ther-language

on, and I've got the advanced reports, so--

6
7

Okay, where are you?

THE COURT:

Two sentences above, it's "For

example?"
MR. MITCHELL:

Okay, three sentences above.

I

apologize.

10

THE COURT:

Okay, "That would be iLlogical?"

11

MR. MITCHELL:

"As nothing in the instrument

12

itself denies a sole trustee any of the powers possessed by

13

the joint trustee.". In our case the trust instrument

14

specifically denies the sole trustee the power to change the

15

beneficiaries, okay.

16

preventing "Joseph from cutting out the defendants and

17

What they intended on doing is

plaintiff, Linda Jenkins, after Rhoda died and preventing
II
'*
• —

18

Rhoda from doing exactly what she did in this case and that

19

is cutting Jeanine out after Joseph died.

20

what they intended to do, and that's the first rule of

21

construction in interpreting a trust is the intent of the

22

parties, okay.

23

That's exactly

That is a factual distinction with the West case

24

that decides this case right there, okay.

As far as the

25

contingent beneficiary argument, the West Court, when it

1 II emphasizes the death of tfie :sUrvivor-o£-us and says, the
2

children's vested rights, and talks about contingent

3

beneficiaries, points to the Grossbeck case.

4

Grossbeck case, which is 935P(2)12.55 talks about--a

5

contingent remainder, IE, the beneficiaries interest is

6

contingent upon surviving the grand tort, okay.

7

exactly the case in West.

8
9

This is an easy case.

And the

And that's

The West case is

controlling, but the West case says, one, if the trust

10

instrument says something that controls it.

11

then they can revoke it with the power of revocation.

12

here the trust instrument specifically says after one of us

13

dies you can't do that, okay.

14

that basis, Your Honor.

15
16

MR. SKEEN:

If it doesn't,
But

We're going to submit it on

Your Honor, may I have one last word,

there were "cross motions'?

17

THE COURT:

Go ahead.

18

MR. SKEEN:

Even if the Court, the Court, it's a

19

smokescreen.

We don't need to get to the issue of whether

20

or not they could change beneficiaries, you don't even need

21

to get that far.

22

beneficiaries, she terminated the trust, and there's a

23

distinction there.

The document itself, she didn't change the

And by right and by law in the West case

24 fthe three prongs were met, we showed them right in the trust
25 I itself.

And, therefore, she didn't change the

19
1 II b e n e f i c i a r i e s , she d i d n ' t ^ a d d ; a-he-dirdn-^t take t h e m a w a y ,
2

she t e r m i n a t e d it p u r s u a n t to h e r legal a u t h o r i t y t o d o s o .

3

Thanks.

4

MR. MITCHELL:

Y o u r H o n o r , the i n t e n t ^ o f t h e

5

p a r t i e s w a s to p r e v e n t , a n d i t ' s o b v i o u s , i t ' s v e r y c l e a r ,

6

i t ' s u n d i s p u t e d t h a t that w a s t h e intent of J o s e p h a n d R h o d a

7

w a s to p r e v e n t R h o d a f r o m d o i n g e x a c t l y w h a t s h e d i d .

8

a r g u m e n t that she d i d n ' t c h a n g e b e n e f i c i a r i e s , t h a t ' s n o t

9

it, that's not it.

The

Maybe she didn't change b e n e f i c i a r i e s ,

10

s h e r e v o k e d the t r u s t c o n t r a r y t o t h e intent.-

11

s h e c o u l d r e v o k e t h e t r u s t , a n d she c o u l d n ' t , o k a y , s h e

12

c o u l d n ' t d o that b e c a u s e t h a t ' s h o w the p a r t i e s i n t e n d e d it

13

a n d it's v e r y c l e a r .

14

C o u l d she d o it in v i o l a t i o n o f - h e r f i d u c i a r y d u t y

15

(inaudible)?

16

in W e s t .

17

that J e a n i n e or that J e a n i n e s u r v i v e R h o d a in o r d e r t o b e a

18

beneficiary, okay.

19

But suppose

Suppose she could revoke the trust.

N o , s h e c o u l d n ' t , a n d that's the d i s t i n c t i o n

It d o e s n ' t r e q u i r e , t h i s trust d o e s n o t r e q u i r e

They point out that this trust has the same

20

language as the West trust.

Well, Your Honor, it has the

21

same l a n g u a g e b u t i t ' s in a d i f f e r e n t p a r a g r a p h , it h a s a

22

different meaning, and it has a different scenario.

23

t h i s l a n g u a g e u p o n the d e a t h of the s u r v i v o r says is t h a t o n

24

the death of the survivors you give the property away and

What

20
l|| don't become beneficiaries' until fe-he—death of a survivor.
2 || So w h e n Counsel stands u p here and says that it d o e s , take a
3 || look at that, Your Honor.

It's a silly argument a n d I don't

4 || k n o w h o w y o u can stand u p here a n d m a k e i t .
5 II

T H E COURT:

O n e at a time.

6 I

M R . MITCHELL:

What this case is about, this is

7 || not a case about greedy p e o p l e , okay.

T h e defendants aren't

8

greedy.

L e t me tell y o u what this case is about.

There's,

9

t h e State of Utah h a s a $35,000 medical lien o n t h e w i l l ,

10

okay.

If defendants w i n this case t h e State -of Utah's paid

11

$ 3 5 , 0 0 0 , okay.

12

p a i d $20,000 or something.

13

doing, a n d it's t h e defendant Lila Harman, she is doing this

14

o u t of spite, okay.

15

going t o g o in h e r pocket if w e win, b u t she wants t o c u t

16

M r s . Purhue out.

17

If plaintiffs w i n this case, p l a i n t i f f s a r e
S o what t h e defendants a r e

She knows that it's more m o n e y that's

This is simply a m a t t e r of spite.

It is n o t

18

legally justifiable, it's n o t factually justifiable a n d i t ' s

19

n o t m o r a l l y justifiable.

20

T H E COURT:

I'm going to grant Summary Judgment

21

finding that the trust w a s terminated b y the sell of t h e

22

property.

23

argument that Mr. Mitchell is correct that the parties

24

wanted to set up a trust that would not be changed after one

25 II died.

The language, I'm assuming for the sake of

I mean, I read that as the intent to the language

21
1 || w h e r e it says, "If o n e of -the r abeve Gristed should be
2 || deceased, the beneficiaries cannot be changed."

But I'm

3 || g o i n g to find as a m a t t e r of law that that is insufficient
4 || to prevent the revocation of the trust after oner of them
5 II d i e s
6 II

That the language is a revocable trust and a s such

7

o n e of the trustees c a n revoke it.

T h e y could not change

8

t h e beneficiaries.

9

w i t h the language that they agreed u p o n .

T h e parties are n o t h e r e , we're stuck
T h e language that

10

they agreed upon w a s that the beneficiaries could not b e

11

c h a n g e d as opposed to t h e trust could n o t b e revoked.

12

h a p p e n to think it's a n unfortunate result b u t I think

13

that's what the language compels.

14

I

Counsel, n o t f o r the purpose of argument, b u t just

15

t o preserve Appellate Review, is there anything that y o u

16

want m e t o address specifically?

17
18

MR. MITCHELL:

Perhaps the third prong of it, t h e

test.

19

T H E COURT:

Which was which one?

20

M R . M I T C H E L L : Whether it breached fiduciary duty.

21

T H E COURT:

Okay, I'm going to find that there is

22

n o t a fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries until they have

23

arrived, which is basically after the surviving trustee

24 dies.
25 I!

MR. MITCHET/T,-

Thank von. Ynnr Hnnnr

MR. SKEEN:

Thank -you,' Your-Honor.

THE COURT:

Anything that you want to address, Mr.

Skeen, for the record?
MR. SKEEN:

No, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Okay, will you draw the findings in

the Order then?
MR. SKEEN:

I will.

Thank

THE COURT:

Thank you.

(Proceedings concluded)

you.
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Addendum C

RANDALL L. SKEEN, £2970
COOK, SKEEN & ROBINSON, L.L.C.
Attorney for Defendants
Lila Ann Herman and
Lloyd Mitchell
3760 South Highland Drive, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: 273-3933

IN THE DISTRICT COURT 0? THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JEANNINE PERRENOUD; and
LINDA JENKINS
Plaintiffs,

1
1

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

;
;
;
]i
]
]
]

Civil No. 9739/0675

vs.
LILA ANN HARMAN, individually
and in her capacity as Personal
Representative of the Estate of
Rhoda Nelson Mitchell Thurber;
LLOYD MITCHELL;
JOHN DOES I THROUGH V; and
JANE DOES I THROUGH V

w

Judge William A. Thome
Defendants.

]

Plaintiffs' and Defendants' Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment
came on regularly for hearing on the 28th day of August, 1998,
before the Honorable William A. Thome, District Court Judge.
Plaintiff Perrenoud was present and represented by her counsel,
Scott B. Mitchell and Defendants were not present but represented
by their counsel, Randall L. Skeen and Todd R. Mecham.

Based upon

the pleadings and papers contained within the Court's file, the

evidence presented at the hearing, argument of counsel and good
cause appearing, the Court hereby finds and orders as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On April

1, 1980, Joseph Thurber

and Rhoda Thurber

executed an inter-vivos trust known as the Thurber Trust. Pursuant
to the terms of the Thurber Trust, Joseph and Rhoda Thurber were
appointed as Trustees.

Thereafter certain property;as identified

within the Trust was transferred to the Trust.
2.

Paragraph 3 of the Thurber Trust authorized the Thurbers

to revoke the Trust by selling or otherwise disposing of any part
of the property held within the Trust, without obtaining the
consent of any named beneficiary.
3.

Paragraph 5 of the Thurber Trust authorized a surviving

co-trustee to act as sole trustee of the Trust.
4.

In 1985, Joseph Thurber died.

5.

On June 29, 1992, Rhoda Thurber executed a Will and Trust

which revoked all prior testamentary instruments.

Said Will and

Trust did not identify Plaintiffs as beneficiaries and appointed
Defendants as trustees and beneficiaries.
6.

On or about August 15, 1992, Rhoda Thurber sold the

property and home identified in the Trust documents to Robert
Bezzant and Holli Bezzant.
7.

On December 22, 1996, Rhoda Thurber died.

2

8.

Pursuant to order of this Court, Defendant Lila M. Herman

was appointed Personal Representative of the Estate of Rhoda Nelson
Mitchell Thurber.
9. Rhoda Thurber as surviving co-Settlor and sole trustee had
authority to terminate the Thurber Trust prior to her death.
10.

Rhoda Thurber was an active beneficiary of the Trust and

Plaintiffs were contingent beneficiaries of the Trust.
11.

As the sole surviving acting beneficiary, Rhoda Thurber

could act to terminate the Thurber Trust without breaching a
fiduciary duty to any contingent beneficiary.
12.

Rhoda Thurber did not change the beneficiaries of the

Thurber Trust.
13.

The Thurber Trust was terminated by Rhoda Thurber upon

her sale of the property on or about August 15, 1992.
14.

There

are no witnesses

to provide

testimony

and,

therefore, the Court must construe the clear language of the Trust
documents.
15.

The Trust provisions relating to changing beneficiaries

and disposition of proceeds from sale of the home are insufficient
to prevent Rhoda Thurber from revoking the Trust.
16.

Defendants did not convert any property belonging to

Plaintiffs.

3

17.

Rhoda Thurber did not owe Plaintiffs a fiduciary duty

with respect to administration of the Thurber Trust as the same had
been revoked.
18.

Defendant Lila M. Karman did not owe Plaintiffs a

fiduciary duty with respect to the Thurber Trust as the same had
been revoked.
ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and good cause
appearing, the Court hereby orders as follows:
1. Summary judgment is hereby entered in favor of Defendants
pursuant to their Counterclaim and against Plaintiffs; and
2.

Plaintiffs' Complaint iPK^^tflJX dismissed with prejudice.

DATED this

1^

day of September, 1998.
BY THE CQUR

f&^>^
i4jq
WILLIAM;A. .THORtfE
Di s t r f<$t -JSourtri^;
• LA \

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The foregoing Findings of Fact and Order was mailed to Scott
B. Mitchell at 175 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, UT
this

.S

84111 on

day of September 1998.
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